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Abstract. David e. Cooper proposes that the ‘mystery’ of ‘reality as it “anyway” 
is, independently of human perspective’ provides measure for the leading of 
our lives and thus avoids, on the one hand, the hubris of a humanism for which 
moral life is the product of the human will and has no warrant beyond it, and, 
on the other, a  theism which appears to be at once too remote from and too 
close to the human world to provide any such warrant. The paper rejects the 
role this gives to ‘mystery’ and locates ‘warrant’ in a moral perspective that is 
not the product of will.
over fifty years ago an Indian philosopher, Daya Krishna, attended 
a symposium in the West on the philosophy of religion. In an insightful 
paper he reflected on his experience, and mildly remarked how skewed 
the discussions were by an unselfconscious concentration on Christianity. 
He was drawing attention to a bias that has hardly changed since:
The other great limitation of the discussion ... was its confinement, 
perhaps naturally, to Christianity alone. It was as if one were to reflect 
on aesthetic experience and confine one’s discussion to Greek art or 
the renaissance masters only ... That no one challenged this implicit 
limitation shows once again the difficulty of getting beyond the 
perspective of the culture one happens to be born in.1
1 Daya Krishna, ‘religious experience, language and Truth’, in Religious Experience 
and Truth, ed. by Sidney Hook, (New York: New York university Press, 1961) and 
reprinted in The Art of the Conceptual: Explorations in a Conceptual Maze Over Three 
Decades (Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical research, 1989), pp. 112-121 (p. 114).
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Professional philosophers of religion were mainly Christians and ex-
Christians and their main work would have been on the efficacy of the 
proofs for the existence of God and of the rationality of belief as these 
questions were received through the european traditions. They would 
mostly acknowledge, if nudged, their debt to the Jewish and Arab 
philosophers, but would return to focus on the current state of the argument 
as represented by their contemporaries. The eastern traditions were largely 
ignored, by philosophers of religion, but also by western philosophers 
generally, who would fail to see much ‘philosophy’ there at all.
That these traditions are now slightly less ignored, at least by 
younger members of the profession, is thanks to such thinkers as David 
Cooper, whose work has helped us expand our notion of what it is to 
do philosophy at all. Cooper is one of the very few philosophers in the 
united Kingdom to have broken free from this cultural limitation and 
indeed from the more inward-looking, self-referential forms of analytic 
philosophy, looking first towards forms of continental philosophy which 
try to answer questions that analytic philosophy has not thought to ask.2 
but the gradual shift of perspective that opens to view the influence 
of the Asian and east Asian traditions on the Western, in the work of 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Heidegger – and in the latter case the 
influence was crucially mutual – owes much to Cooper’s developing sense 
of World Philosophy, a  sense that helps us redefine the philosophical 
canon. There is a political dimension to this. Nowadays certain politicians 
and Churchmen, catching an unpleasant public mood, express anxiety 
about ‘multiculturalism’, which they conceive as a  restive, mutually 
incurious and tensely maintained tolerance between communities – 
politically correct but refusing to engage – whereas the possibilities for 
fusion, artistic, intellectual and spiritual, are now starting to become 
available. We sometimes wring our hands about the public engagement 
of philosophers, but Cooper’s work, first of all on continental philosophy 
and later on world philosophy, particularly the eastern traditions, has 
shown how a critical cultural engagement is possible – an engagement 
which some might think alters our conception of what the philosophical 
questions are.
2 A point made in conversation by michael Weston (university of essex).
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I. CommoN GrouND AND SCePTICISm AbouT ‘mYSTerY’
David Cooper’s writing is analytically sharp, but also sometimes indirect 
and elusive in ways which are creatively engaging. In what follows I shall 
express some scepticism about his direction of thought in a  recent 
paper, ‘mystery, World and religion’,3 but the scepticism derives from 
a perplexity which I hope makes for a fruitful conversation and it may be 
that I have failed to understand him and am at cross purposes.
Cooper seeks to contend against what he calls ‘a  raw, hubristic 
humanism’,4 but also to avoid what a  surprising number of thinkers 
take to be the only alternative, some version of theism,5 thinkers who 
take humanism to be essentially hubristic, on the grounds that it 
depends upon the disposition of the human will. This puts Cooper in 
a very interesting position because it looks as though, inspired by east 
Asian traditions, he is seeking middle ground between the great polar 
opposites of contemporary religious debate, a middle ground as it might 
seem between secularism and theism – though more plausibly between 
secularism and ‘religion’, since it is hard to see how there can be middle 
ground between what are presumably exclusive alternatives. on the other 
hand, however, there can be common ground between the protagonists 
and this may be the middle ground between secularism and religion if we 
can see some aspect of the religious life, some aspect of what we might 
still want to call spirituality, that allows us to make sense of that idea. 
one of the salient features of Christianity is the terror and hope of the 
Garden of Gethsemane, the crucifixion, and the resurrection – and if 
we prefer a different symbolism because of anxiety about metaphysical 
commitments, that’s fine so long as we don’t neglect in our thinking the 
passages of life that we find need ritual re-enactment and expression. If 
our secularism is obsessed with an anti-theological triumphalism, it may 
neglect the necessary poetry – or the reflective reading of that poetry 
that together with it contributes to a cultural tradition which enshrines 
and depicts our profound predicaments and moral conflicts.
3 David e. Cooper, ‘mystery, World and religion’, in Philosophers and God: At the 
Frontiers of Faith and Reason, ed. by John Cornwell and michael mcGhee (london: 
Continuum, 2009), pp. 51-62.
4 An expression which leaves open the possibility that there can be an unraw and 
unhubristic humanism.
5 See, for instance, Gordon Graham, ‘religion and Theology’, Philosophers and God: At 
the Frontiers of Faith and Reason, ed. by John Cornwall and michael mcGhee (london: 
Continuum, 2009), pp. 217-230.
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Cooper seems to locate the middle ground when at the beginning of 
his paper he describes the path that led him to think that
(r)eality as it ‘anyway’ is, independently of human perspective, is 
mysterious.6
The question, of course, is whether this is true, though that question 
must wait upon an interpretation of the remark. Is it true that ‘reality 
as it “anyway” is, independently of human perspective’ is ‘mysterious’? 
What is being claimed? It is the reference to mystery and the role Cooper 
wants to give it that I find perplexing. He construes ‘mystery’ as ‘what 
cannot, even in principle, be conceptualised or literally articulated’. but 
it does not seem to me that what cannot be conceptualised – what is not 
‘discursive’, to use the word Cooper borrows from Kant – is therefore 
‘mysterious’. but the role Cooper gives to ‘the mysterious’ is that it 
provides ‘measure for the leading of our lives, something for these to 
answer to’.7 my doubts about the application of the term ‘mystery’ will 
lead to questions about just what can provide a ‘measure for the leading 
of our lives’ ... ‘something for these to answer to’. This in turn will lead to 
reflection on the question whether humanism is essentially ‘hubristic’ – 
or whether particular formulations of it lead to that impression.
II. INTImATIoNS oF ... ‘THe mYSTerIouS’?
even within common experience there is much that cannot be described 
or ‘conceptualised’ – except by comparison to other things that also 
cannot be described, as a wine taster identifies the aroma of strawberries 
or plums in the bouquet of a  wine. Nor is there anything mysterious 
about the taste of a merlot, though it may be interesting. As for what goes 
beyond the possibility of human experience, ex hypothesi that cannot be 
conceptualised either – but is it to that extent ‘mysterious’? The stakes are 
high, as we have seen – Cooper conceives its role as providing measure 
and something to answer to: something necessary but unavailable to 
a hubristic humanism.
It is important to see just how strange this claim is: it is ‘reality’ that 
is mysterious and thus provides the measure for the leading of our lives. 
Surely a very particular conception of reality is being invoked here and 
it is this which gives specific content to the notion of ‘mystery’ – but can 
6 David e. Cooper, ‘mystery, World and religion’, p. 51.
7 David e. Cooper, ‘mystery, World and religion’, p. 55.
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any conception of ‘reality’ give content and point to talk of ‘mystery’ and 
what grounds do we have for supposing that what it supplies is a measure? 
lots of things are ‘mysterious’ but under what conditions does that kind 
of talk become interesting?
but now, if ‘the mysterious’ is to play this role of providing a measure 
it is ‘essential that one is offered intimations of, and an attunement to, 
the mysterious which enables the faith that lives led in certain ways do 
answer to, or are consonant with, the way of things’.8 This last expression, 
‘the way of things’, is a revealing alternative to the bare talk of ‘reality as it 
“anyway” is’. It is reminiscent of Taoist talk of the Way. It seems to me to at 
least make sense to talk of human conduct being attuned to or consonant 
with ‘the way of things’, or even to talk of ‘the way of things’ providing 
a measure, since it implies the idea of a rhythm of life that we can also fail 
to be attuned to and can come to see that this is so. but this attunement 
to or consonance with the way of things thus understood is not obviously 
a matter of being attuned to the mysterious – even if ‘the way of things’ 
eludes our conceptual grasp it does not follow that it is ‘mysterious’.
Cooper talks of those who have come to a sense of ‘the mystery of 
reality’ through special experiences – what he calls ‘Tintern Abbey 
moments’. but I  wonder whether this is an example of a  sense of ‘the 
mystery of reality’ or, rather, of a sense, well, to continue with Wordsworth, 
of ‘something far more deeply interfused’. We often talk of a  sense or 
intimation of ‘something’ that we cannot, at least at the moment, grasp 
or understand. but ‘something far more deeply interfused’ is a resonant 
phrase suggestive of the idea of an active presence coursing through all 
things, something, in other words, it is not difficult to think of as a divine, 
creative presence ... even if we conceive it in Spinozistic terms as natura 
naturans. It is a sense of that, though, of a presence within reality – or 
better, within the cosmos or ‘creation’ – rather than of ‘mystery’ or even 
of ‘the mystery of reality’. As Wordsworth puts it, ‘we see into the life of 
things’, a phrase which suggests a kind of knowledge of ‘the way of things’, 
though not a  conceptual knowledge, and it may indeed be as he says 
‘but a vain belief ’. However, it may be that ‘seeing into the life of things’ 
transforms us in ways that we might call an attunement – not to mystery, 
indeed, but to the way of things.
Now once we start to reflect on what must be the nature of this 
presence and what we can know or understand of it, we might then 
8 Ibid., p. 62.
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start talking of ‘mystery’ – which is a word by which we acknowledge 
that such a nature is beyond our powers to discern or comprehend. It is 
what we cannot comprehend that makes the term ‘mystery’ interesting, 
and we shall come to that – but ‘mystery’ is not as it were the immediate 
object of what we sense or discern in the Tintern Abbey moment. What 
we sense is presence rather than mystery, even if we come to conclude 
that the ‘presence’ is indeed ‘mysterious’. We might simply remain with 
The Prelude, with ‘a dim and undetermined sense | of unknown modes 
of being’,9 where the emphasis is on ‘undetermined’ but perhaps allowing 
us to move, through reflection, towards ‘beyond human determination 
altogether’ – but the object of this indeterminability is not ‘reality as it 
anyway is’ but simply ‘unknown (or even unknowable) modes of being’ 
– aspects and dimensions of reality that we are not aware of or cannot 
conceivably become aware of – though how this could provide a measure 
for living our lives is seriously problematic.
Talk of an active presence coursing through all things may be poetic 
but it is also philosophically incautious. Does the Tintern Abbey poem 
express a sense of the presence of the divine? Well, if it does, it would be 
a sense of divinity rather than of the ‘mystery of reality’ even if, as I have 
said, we conclude that the nature of that divinity must be a  mystery 
to us. more to the point, though, these intimations are the work of 
the imagination leading to a  surmise, a  sense that there is a  presence 
moving through all things. The phrase ‘a sense of something’ may imply 
a direct awareness or it may be used propositionally, a sense that there 
is something. That there is a propositional interpretation does not make 
the experience less profound. Wordsworth’s ‘blessed mood’, in other 
words, does not put us in touch with ‘the mysterious’ but with what 
might lead us to think the idea of what must be mysterious in its ultimate 
nature. In the right sort of contemplative mood, the vivid and powerful 
forces of nature, whether serene or tempestuous, beautiful or sublime, 
can impress their presence upon us, and our sense of this presence works 
on the imagination and can give rise to or reinforce the idea of a divine 
creative reality of which these forces become the symbol or image. Not 
far from here they then step down in the form of Apollo or Athena or 
Poseidon ... whose ‘reality’ is constantly reaffirmed by the liveliness of 
the presence of the forces that symbolise them, putting us back in touch 
9 William Wordsworth, ‘The Prelude’ [1805], in The Complete Poetical Works of William 
Wordsworth, Henry reed (ed.) (Philadelphia: Troutman and Hayes, 1852), p. 479.
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with what they themselves symbolise. There is sufficient epistemological 
humility available here without recourse to talk of mystery – in the 
thought that there are aspects or dimensions of reality, of what there is, 
that are beyond our grasp. but the Tintern Abbey moment gets us to 
‘mystery’ only when we have already interpreted it theistically.
Cooper also refers to ‘littler, humbler things ... like the frog-plopping, 
bird-cheeping and bamboo-rustling that have been the occasion for Zen 
poets to communicate their sense of the mystery of things’.10 but is that 
what they seek to communicate, the ‘sense of the mystery of things’? – as 
opposed, say, to their suchness, the suchness of these individual things, 
their haecceitas – ‘it strikes like lightning to hear him sing’. Cooper 
has talked of ‘what cannot, even in principle, be conceptualised or 
literally articulated’, but here we refer to what in experience cannot be 
conceptualised or articulated, viz. the resonant presence of particular 
things. The sound of the bird interrupts the flow of activities that generally 
prevent us from just listening – where ‘just listening’ is a dwelling in the 
experience rather than simply noting that a bird is singing. I imagine that 
the former would count as an example of ‘non-conceptual experience’, 
in the sense, perhaps, that its content is not accommodated within our 
concepts (its individuality is not what our concepts reveal), but it is 
also true that such experiences are not ‘discursable’ ... when we seek to 
communicate them, as with the Hopkins line, as with the wine or coffee, 
we do not so much describe them as compare them to other experiences 
that are equally non-discursable. The point here is that the sound of 
the bird does not give us a sense of the mystery of things – but we gain 
access to an aspect of reality that eludes the grasp of our concepts. The 
sound of the frog or that of the bird, the rustling of the bamboo, breaks 
a silence that is already an object of the Zen monk’s attention as well as its 
condition. So it is also an image of reality manifesting itself to us within 
the limits of the senses, an image of what comes forth out of the silence 
when the mind is still, a perspective as well as an object.
III. A THeoloGICAl CIrCumSCrIPTIoN oF ‘mYSTerY’
Although David Cooper is very well aware of the possible theistic 
moves here, moves from which, as we shall see, he has his own reasons 
to distance himself, it is nevertheless true, as I  have just hinted, that 
10 David e. Cooper, ‘mystery, World and religion’, p. 51.
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talk of ‘mystery’ has traditionally had a  specific theological content, 
though  of course we use the term idiomatically to refer to something 
that we don’t understand or that we lack information about, as when we 
can’t work out whodunit. more fundamentally from the point of view 
of classical theism – which I seek here to present rather than defend – it 
is God’s nature that is the ultimate and transcendent mystery, where the 
reference to mystery is very specifically to the nature of the source of all 
created things, a source which is beyond the order of all beings, supra 
ordinem omnium entium. It is this being beyond the order (or way) of 
things which gives content to the talk of mystery and the mysterious. 
We can, according to this tradition, know by the light of natural reason 
that there is a God; we can, moreover, know what God is not; what we 
cannot know is what God is. It is not reality but the divine nature that is 
mysterious, in the sense that the source and origin of all cannot but be 
beyond all comprehension, beyond understanding, not a possible object 
of experience. even here we can make a distinction between the idea of 
what within the cosmos or the universe could not be conceptualised, and 
the divine source of that cosmos that is beyond comprehension. It is the 
latter that is ‘mysterious’. What God is remains beyond all comprehension 
and is in this sense ‘a mystery’. To put it another way, and to remain within 
this tradition, what accounts for the existence of things – ‘what we call 
“God”’ as Aquinas phrases it – is beyond all human comprehension, and 
it is for this reason that it is called a mystery. What is ‘mysterious’ in this 
tradition is not ‘reality as it “anyway” is’ but the nature or being of what 
accounts for reality whether or not it is independent of human perspective.
If I may make a sideways move here, in relation to the proliferation 
of talk of mystery and ‘the mysterious’, it is significant that some 
philosophical theologians have wanted to say that the very existence of 
things is ‘mysterious’ – not that their nature is a mystery to us, but that 
they exist at all. This seems to me to be a  mistake. It is the nature of 
what accounts for the very existence of things that is a mystery. What 
stands in need of accounting for is not ‘mysterious’; it simply stands in 
need of accounting for. The ‘mysterious’ is precisely what cannot itself be 
accounted for. Herbert mcCabe’s seminal article, ‘Creation’,11 is I think 
responsible for a common misremembering of a famous sentence from 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (6.44) in which he is quoted by mcCabe as 
saying: ‘it is not how things are in the world that is mysterious (sic), but 
11 Geoffrey Chapman, ‘Creation’, in God Matters (london: Continuum, 1987), pp. 2-9.
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that it is.’ The phrase Wittgenstein uses in fact is das Mystische, a term he 
uses a little later in 6.45: ‘Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this 
that is mystical.’12 It is hard to see how ‘mysterious’ properly translates 
either remark, though the misquotation may reflect the direction of 
mcCabe’s thought as he reflects on the question, why is there anything at 
all. Interestingly, in Wittgenstein’s lecture on ethics he says ‘I wonder at 
the existence of the world’.13 but wonder here is not wonder at mystery, 
even if such wonder leads a person to acknowledge a divine nature that 
is a mystery.
The point of all this is not that the terms ‘mystery’ and ‘the mysterious’ 
are the private property of the theologians, as that we need to see what 
the new application is doing, especially in connection with the idea of 
‘reality as it “anyway” is, independently of human perspective’. What 
would it mean to be attuned to or to act in consonance with what is thus 
mysterious – or fail to be? my difficulty with and hesitation about an 
idea of the ‘mysterious’ cut free from theology concerns precisely how to 
make sense of it as something we could be attuned to or consonant with. 
And the question is whether it genuinely cuts free, or smuggles back 
some kind of theistic content. In any event, ‘the mysterious’ seems to 
be already thereby loaded with a content that cannot really be provided 
simply by the phrase ‘reality as it anyway is’. It is not just what is hidden 
or concealed from us that warrants talk of ‘mystery’, but the creative 
source and sustainer of all things, i.e., it is something worshipped. To put 
it another way, what is not worshipped is not that mysterious!
Certainly Cooper wants to keep clear of any theistic content. He 
reports a conversation with his Theology colleague, Andrew louth, about 
why even an apophatic theology cannot provide what he wants from his 
account of mystery. He refers to two opposite tendencies of theologians, 
to make God too human and to make him too transcendent to provide 
the measure he is looking for. As for being ‘too human’ he claims that 
God is ‘too much a denizen of the human world ... to provide measure 
for our conception of the world, too much a “projection”, as it were, of 
what we anyway hold dear and important to serve as any kind of warrant 
for our holding them so’.14 The key idea here is that of ‘warrant for our 
12 See also Tractatus 6.522: ‘There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. 
They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.’
13 l. Wittgenstein, ‘A lecture on ethics’, The Philosophical Review, 74/1 (1965), 3-12 (p. 8).
14 David e. Cooper, ‘mystery, World and religion’, pp. 59-60.
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holding them so’ and I shall return to it when I address the alleged hubris 
of humanism, partly because I  wonder whether talk of ‘warrant’ here 
suggests a  crypto-theism, though we need to see what Cooper thinks 
he is guarding against and whether what is at fault is a  conception of 
humanism that makes it appear hubristic. If, however,  we hold on to 
a  declaration of God’s ineffability and utter transcendence we find 
ourselves with the problem of ‘a disjunctive, two levels account of world 
and mystery’.15
Cooper writes trenchantly against the idea of a disjunctive two level 
account of the notion of ‘reality as it “anyway” is, independently of 
human perspective’, and draws on texts from Nietzsche and Heidegger, 
as well as on the Taoist and Zen traditions as he formulates an account 
which concludes as follows:
This world is not simply a human world, unthinkable in isolation from 
us, but at the same time a realisation of, a coming forth of, something 
to which we can strive to answer and measure up.16
‘reality’ is not distorted or refracted by human perspective, the thought 
is rather that we have a necessarily limited purchase on reality, that is 
to say, a  limited purchase on what we do have a  purchase on, and an 
acknowledgment that there is much that we could never grasp. once 
we make that latter point, however, we open up a  series of fantasy 
populations to colonise these spaces and, as Cooper reminds us, make 
various Platonic or Kantian claims about the causal relation between 
reality as it is in itself and what is available to us in experience.
but I  suggested earlier that the bird singing and the frog plopping 
mentioned by Cooper could be seen as images of things emerging as it 
were into our ken, being realised, made real to us. but I cannot see how 
the world thus conceived is a ‘coming forth of ... something to which we 
can strive to answer and measure up’, unless we conceive what comes 
forth precisely as an ethical perspective on the world we already inhabit 
but which interrogates the terms of that habitation – a  perspective 
discovered, recalled or restored and a  human world ‘renewed’ by that 
perspective. The Zen monk doesn’t simply hear the bird sing or the 
bamboo rustling, but is aware of it with a tender care for its beauty.
15 Ibid., p. 61. Theologians would have much to say about these claims, but this is not 
the occasion for discussing them.
16 Ibid., p. 58.
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IV. APPeArANCe AND reAlITY
As a  means of reflecting on the way Cooper talks about ‘reality as it 
“anyway” is, independently of human perspective’, it might be helpful 
here to turn to an informal sketch of the ambiguities within the 
distinction between appearance and reality, and how the various ways in 
which things appear to us can conceal or reveal their nature – and ours.
There are straightforward empirical applications of this distinction, 
where to talk about ‘reality’ is to talk about how particular things are 
as opposed to how they seem or appear to be. What we have here is 
a  corrective distinction. Whereas things can be just as they appear to 
be, appearances can also be deceptive and we need to be able to correct 
them. To talk about reality in this kind of context is to talk about the 
truth of the matter, the ‘reality of the situation’.
There are related uses, as when we say that ideological mystification 
masks the real nature of the relations of production, for instance, where 
the general appearance of things constitutes an illusion from which 
people need to be freed, and the functional point of the claim is that 
under appropriate conditions access is available to the truth of the 
matter. This might be through closer empirical investigation as in the 
case of an intermittently false consciousness or, and it starts now to look 
more tenuous, by metaphysical argument to a  rationalist monism, for 
instance, or, even more dubiously, by mystic insight into the real nature 
of things. Such disturbing claims are empty unless they can be backed up 
and the truth revealed by some corrective procedure, so that a general 
appearance is discovered to be some kind of distortion or blindness. This 
is not an anti-verificationism issue – such claims can be made without 
our having any means of establishing their truth or falsity – the point 
rather, is that people make discoveries that lead them to realise and then 
declare that the reality is different from the appearance. There can be 
intimations of this kind of possibility as powerful as the Tintern Abbey 
moment, but it is often the painful matter of discovering or seeing the 
world at last without previous illusion, as in the case of eliot’s talk of 
things ill done ... which once we took for exercise of virtue.
There is however a less absolute distinction between appearance and 
reality in which we want to insist upon how things manifest themselves 
to sense or other forms of empirical observation, where such appearance 
is not opposed to ‘reality’ but is a  form of its expression. Nevertheless 
the implication is that we have a necessarily limited experience of reality 
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which impresses itself upon us just to the extent and in the ways that we 
can be thus ‘impressed’ upon – and that much must elude us because the 
possibilities for that manifestation depend upon our limited faculties and 
instruments, so that whatever lies outside their range and how it operates 
is beyond the scope of our understanding. In this sense, all we have is 
‘appearance’ and it would be an error to seek to apply the corrective 
distinction to this. This distinction between appearance and reality is 
not an absolute one since appearance here is precisely of reality – or 
such reality as we are able to assimilate or accommodate into the human 
world, which is a space or home we have carved out for ourselves within 
reality, although this home is not entirely wind and water tight, and it 
can be limited in its dimensions by moral obtuseness or attachment. 
What appears to us is not to be ‘corrected’ by reality, but it may betray 
a limitation of scope that keeps particular realities at bay.
Professor Cooper’s talk of ‘reality as it “anyway” is, independently 
of human perspective’ might be taken to imply that there is a truth of 
the matter – what we have a perspective on – by reference to which we 
estimate the adequacy of a perspective in the light of another, as when 
we are wiping the breakfast table. our perspective on the table from over 
here fails to reveal the coffee stain that is in plain view when we change 
our position. That there is a coffee stain is the reality, the truth of the 
matter, that is available to one perspective but not another, and might not 
be available to either. but the truth of the matter stands independently of 
any perspective we might have on it. The perspective that fails to disclose 
the presence of the stain is not a ‘false’ perspective, but gives rise to a false 
impression if we base upon it the judgment that the table is now clean. 
It is not false but it is inadequate because it fails to pick up a truth we are 
interested in. The significant thing here, though, is that we can become 
attached or locked in to perspectives which conceal what we might need 
to know about, or which prevent a  realisation of, realities we have no 
reason to call ‘mysterious’.
In another sense, ‘independently of human perspective’ seems to 
refer to whatever might lie as it were permanently beyond the scope of 
any human perspective or, by contrast, to what is currently outside that 
scope but which could fall within it under more propitious circumstances. 
The former of these is a more likely candidate for talk of ‘mystery’ but 
implies a transcendence that makes it an unlikely source of ‘measure’ (by 
Cooper’s own test). The latter seems the more likely candidate for talk 
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of realisation or coming forth, but is surely not mysterious since what 
comes forth is precisely a measure not previously available.
V. FreuD AND rIlKe: ForeIGN TerrITorY AND DAS OFFENE
I should like to make a connection between this notion of the world as 
a coming forth with an intriguing remark of Freud’s, and to connect both 
with some thoughts of rilke about what he calls das Offene.
In the first paragraph of Freud’s chapter on the ‘Dissection of the 
Psychical Personality’ in the New Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis17 
he deploys a metaphor that repays attention: ‘the repressed’, he tells us, 
‘is foreign territory to the ego – internal foreign territory – just as reality 
(if you will forgive the unusual expression) is external foreign territory.’18
It is an unusual expression, but highly suggestive in the context of 
what Cooper is drawing attention to, since it suggests a  certain idea 
of resistance to ‘reality’ which is conceived as ‘foreign’ in relation to what 
by contrast must be thought of as ‘home’, but ‘home’, I suggest – and this 
tracks Cooper’s own distinction – in the sense of the human world, so 
that just as what lies over against the ego is the internal foreign territory 
of the repressed so what lies over against the World is the foreign 
territory of ‘reality’. If we think in terms of the distinction between ego 
and the repressed, the corresponding distinction might be between 
‘the world’ conceived as ‘home’ or, to keep the edge of defensiveness, 
‘homeland’, with external foreign territory being ‘reality’ – or better, as 
I would want to say, such reality as is not (yet) assimilated to the confines 
of ‘the world’. The idea of resistance here implies, as Sartre noticed, that 
at some subliminal level, or evanescently, we are perfectly well aware of 
what transcends our dominant perceptions, of what transcends or passes 
beyond ‘the world’ we do not want to let go of because we are too much 
at home in it, too comfortable.
In the eighth of his Duino Elegies rilke talks about what he calls 
Das Offene:
17 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Dissection of the Psychical Personality’, in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachley 
(london: Hogarth Press, 1957). I have discussed this passage briefly elsewhere in ‘In the 
beginning was the Deed: Philosophers, reality and the World’, in Practical Philosophy, 
Volume 8, No. 2 (2007), 49-53.
18 ‘... das Verdrängste ist aber für das Ich Ausland, inneres Ausland, so wie die realität 
– gestatten Sie den ungwohnten Ausdruck – äusseres Ausland ist.’ Ibid., p. 88.
46 mICHAel mCGHee
With all their eyes the animals all see 
What lies open. only our eyes are turned 
As it were away and set like snares 
Around their clear way out19
There is a grotesque or at least ungainly fusion of ideas and images here 
which passes from what is represented by the direction of our gaze away 
from das Offene to a representation of our eyes as snares set around it to 
prevent others from leaving. The direction of our gaze implies that we 
are in some way hostile to das Offene and to those who are aware of its 
presence – in a way that recalls the reception of Plato’s liberated prisoner. 
If Freud defines a  resident temptation, a  resistance, rilke offers us 
a description of what it might be to overcome that temptation, though he 
strongly acknowledges the presence of resistance too. Freud captures the 
resistance to what will disturb the settled formation of a world, on analogy 
with the disturbance of the ego and its formation ... so we can see how this 
might fit with Cooper’s talk of realisation or coming forth: it is not always 
welcome and this suggests the need for cultivating a certain disposition 
of openness towards the not yet apprehended or accommodated which, 
if I understand rilke, is das Offene just because it is not yet closed off and 
brought into our purview, confined within the range of our formation. It 
will always elude this as what still remains there, open to view because 
it is there to be seen, but unobserved because we live within what we have 
grasped and, to make full use of the negative associations of ‘grasping’, our 
attachments prevent us seeing what is there, which is a vision of things 
from another perspective which incorporates the values that provide the 
measure for our lives that Cooper seeks in ‘the mysterious’.
When he uses the term ‘the world’ Cooper generally distinguishes 
it from the term ‘reality’. He occasionally uses them interchangeably, 
though in the wider sense of the latter. The narrower sense of the former 
is determined by the interests and perspectives that make it an essentially 
human world, which is ‘the way it is’ only in relation to those human 
perspectives. Such a world is distinguished from ‘reality as it “anyway” 
is, independently of human perspective’. It looks as though we have here 
a  larger and a  smaller whole or totality, the distinction between them 
19 my translation, though I generally refer to the leishman/Spender translation. rainer 
maria rilke, Duino Elegies: The German Text with an English Translation, Introduction 
and Commentary by J. B. Leishman & Stephen Spender (london: The Hogarth Press, 
1948), pp. 76-81.
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mediated by the presence or absence of human concerns – and it is the 
presence of this human perspective that determines a  world and the 
implication is that the concept of ‘reality’ transcends that of ‘the world’ – 
a world in this sense is just such reality as we apprehend, reality as seen 
and acted in from the point of view of such perspectives, interests, etc. 
In other words, there is no absolute distinction here – the world is always 
a human world and just is such reality as we scramble around and have as 
it were a purchase on – a habitation – and what we have a purchase on will 
always be determined by, restricted to, our finite powers of apprehension, 
but also the nature of our interests and our attachments or ‘graspings’.
VI. IS HumANISm reAllY HubrISTIC?
remember that the idea of ‘mystery’ or ‘the ‘mysterious’ had a strategic 
role in the overcoming of what Cooper considers to be a philosophical 
impasse that arises when you want to deny both a  certain kind of 
absolutism and what he came to see as an ‘impossibly raw and hubristic 
style of humanism’. What he has in mind is ‘the claim, or boast, that 
human commitments, values and perspectives neither permit nor require 
any warrant beyond themselves – for there is no “beyond” for them to 
answer to. In Sartre’s words, there is “no legislator” but man, so that “life 
is a  game” whose “principles man himself ordains”’. Cooper observes 
that this ‘raw humanism’ is hubristic since ‘it attributes to human beings 
a capacity they do not have – that of genuinely living with the thought 
that nothing they commit themselves to, none of the values and beliefs 
they embrace, can be answerable to anything beyond this commitment 
and embrace’.20 He thinks that anyone who claims such a capacity ‘cannot 
really believe what they are saying’:
For when immersed in the stream of life, we are required to make 
decisions, take directions and pursue objectives that it is impossible for 
us to regard as having no further authority than their being the ones we 
happen to have made, taken and pursued. If that were the only authority, 
then it could not have mattered to us if the decisions, directions and 
objectives had been different. And that is tantamount to saying that 
nothing we do matters more or less than anything else.21
20 David e. Cooper, ‘mystery, World and religion’, p. 53.
21 Ibid.
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I want to see just what we should resist in the raw, hubristic humanism 
Cooper sketches out here since the way we look at it will make a difference 
to how we conceive the alternatives. What is the conception that Cooper 
thinks cannot be lived? ‘[W]hen immersed in the stream of life, we are 
required to make decisions, take directions and pursue objectives that it 
is impossible for us to regard as having no further authority than their 
being the ones we happen to have made, taken and pursued.’ If they have 
no further authority than that, then it could not have mattered to us if 
they had been different.
So, what is the point of introducing a question of ‘authority’ here in 
relation to decisions, directions and objectives? The first thing to observe 
is that what Cooper talks about are things that we do – make decisions, 
take directions and pursue objectives. It at least makes sense, in that case, 
to talk about our having reasons for doing the one thing or the other, 
so that whether it matters whether we do the one thing or the other is 
a question we can only answer in the light of a consideration of those 
reasons and the relationship in which we stand to them. We are, generally, 
‘answerable’ for our actions; when we think of a measure for judging how 
we live we are again concerned with our conduct.
but if we look at what else Cooper says in indicting the hubris of 
this humanism, what we find is that his approach is problematically 
voluntaristic. He talks about the claim, or boast, that human commitments, 
values and perspectives (my italics) neither permit nor require any 
warrant beyond themselves – for there is no ‘beyond’ for them to answer 
to. In Sartre’s words, there is ‘no legislator’ but man, so that ‘life is a game’ 
whose ‘principles man himself ordains’. What we need, according to 
Cooper, is a ‘beyond the human’, ‘something which could serve to give 
measure to our lives’. essentially Cooper is claiming that we cannot 
allow that our commitments, etc., have no warrant beyond themselves 
but he concludes, wrongly in my view, that what we need is a ‘beyond the 
human’ which could serve to give measure to our lives.
The problem is that Cooper offers us a mixed list – ‘commitments, 
values and perspectives’ – and only one of these – commitments – lends 
itself to Sartre’s talk of ‘legislation’ or what we ‘ordain’. It is only in the 
case of commitment that we can readily talk of something that we do 
and it is only in the case of what we do that we can really talk about 
‘answerability’. If I am answerable to someone I have to defend or justify 
my conduct to them. In a similar way, if we talk about ‘answerability’ or 
‘measurement’, then it is our actions, our conduct, that we measure or 
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answer for. It looks as though when Cooper talks of ‘a beyond the human’ 
he is really thinking, quite properly, of something beyond the human will 
or, better, beyond the mere fact that we will things so. The metaphor of 
setting a value on something can lead us into thinking that we confer 
value and once we start thinking in that way we are likely to go on to 
the thought that this conferring of value is a bare act of the will and that 
we can as easily withdraw as confer, whereas it is in the light of reasons 
that our will points in one direction rather than another; and we do not 
choose these reasons.
However, by contrast, if we come to the question of the values and 
perspectives that we ‘embrace’ (a  term which misleadingly suggests 
a voluntary act) it should be clear that we are not naming things that we 
do but rather the point of view or perspective in the light of which we do 
them or fail to do them, so that our answerability – the context in which 
we tend to think in terms of being answerable – is partly a function of 
how we regard our failure to act. We are talking of the terms in which we 
assess whether we have acted well or badly and these are not the product 
of the will. It is true that they are not warranted, but that is because they 
are the warrant for our actions, the terms in which we judge them. our 
values and perspectives are not the products of the human will: they 
inform it, provide the measure by which we judge our actions – they 
are if you like the ‘conscience’ to which we are answerable and it has 
‘authority’ because it is by reference to it that we make our judgments. 
We do not choose our values, nor do we choose the perspective in the 
light of which we regard the world. We do not choose that it is the case 
that these considerations move us ... This provides the terms in which 
we judge whether our doing this or some other thing matters. Sartre’s 
voluntarism is askew, but askew for an interesting reason. He makes 
human beings the legislators because his version of atheism depends 
upon a  theology of  the divine will as determining the rightness or 
wrongness of action and, in the absence of that divine being, the only 
other will that is available is the human one. but theologically the divine 
will is already the will of a just and loving God, so if our atheism takes 
account of that we are not so much left with the human will as a will that 
is informed at least some times by considerations of love and justice, in 
whose absence the race languishes. It is not how the will happens to be 
disposed that matters but what informs that disposition.
What I have resisted is the idea that ‘mystery’ has a significant role to 
play in the emergence of what Cooper calls ‘measure for our lives’. What 
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I should want to endorse, however, is the idea of a realisation or coming 
forth of what we might be said to answer to. The image he provides of 
the Zen monk and an attentive silence is the image of the calming of  the 
passions which allows a dormant or overlain moral perspective to emerge 
into view, a coming forth whose possibility we otherwise resist because 
it disturbs the settled domesticity of a human, all too human world. This 
form of attention is indeed an attention to reality in the sense that it puts 
into question the contours and limits of the world we find ourselves not 
very securely at home in.
